The logic is the independent choice logic (ICL) that allows 1 This paper introduces the independent choice logic, and in particular the "single agent with na ture" instance of the independent choice logic, namely I CLoT . This is a logical framework for decision making uncertainty that extends both logic programmin g and stochastic models such as influence diagrams. This paper shows how the representation of a decision problem within the independent choice logic can be exploited to cut down the combinatorics of dynamic program ming. One of the main problems with influence diagram evaluation techniques is the need to opti mise a decision for all values of the 'parents' of a decision variable. In this paper we show how the rule based nature of the ICLoT can be exploited so that we only make distinctions in the values of the information available for a decision that will make a difference to utility.
Introduction
Most current approaches to solving decision problems un der uncertainty involve a case analysis on all available in formation (for example on all current and past observations and past actions in influence diagrams [Howard and Math eson, 1981; Cooper, 1988; Shachter and Peot, 1992; Qi and Poole, 1995] , or on the current belief state in partially ob servable Markov decision problems (PO MOPs) [Monahan, 1982; Cassandra et al., 1994] ).
In this paper, we consider how a logic-based representation of decision problems that treats causal rules as logic pro grams can be exploited to reduce the case analysis for dy namic programmin g. This representation that allows one to express logical rules and choices made by various agents, is capable of representing general decision problems (that ex tends both influence diagrams and (finite stage) POMDPs).
• Scholar, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research for a space of independent choices and a logic program that gives the consequences of these choices. The choices can be made by nature (which has probabilities over the choices) or by purposive agents (who are trying to max imise their utility). The ICL extends the author's probabilis tic Hom abduction [Poole, 1993b] to include negation as failure and multiple agents. In this paper we only consider the decision theoretic (single agent under uncertainty) case. For the no-agent case (with probabilities over choices), the rules induce an independence equivalent to that of Bayesian networks. The rules also allow the representation of a form of 'propositional independence' where one variable may only be dependent on another for some values of a third variable. It is this last property that we exploit in this pa per.
The main point of this paper is to show how the rule structure can be exploited to gain efficiency. The rules pro vide a modular specification of utility, and a modular spec ification of what will be observed when a decision is made (this is similar to using decision trees to specify the proba bility and utility tables [Smith et al., 1993; Boutilier et al., 1995] ). Instead of optimizing a decision for each of its in formation states, we 'mesh' the decision trees for the 'ob servables' (the information available when the decision is made) and the decision trees for the utilities, and only make the distinctio n s in the observables that matter (would lead to different utilities). We show by example that this can cut down on the number of optimizations that we need to do. The meshing becomes complicated when interleaved with dominance testing-we want to prune dominated de cisions as soon as possible, so we don't make distinctions that are only important for decisions than can be shown to be non-optimal. This paper could have been described in terms of decision trees (as does [Boutilier et al., 1995] using a similar idea for fully observable MOPs, see Section 6). This was not done for a number of reasons. The ICL forms a simple log ical framework that includes influence diagrams (the rules can encode all of the dependencies of an influence diagram -we don't need the influence diagram and the rules), as well as being interesting in its own right as a mix of logic and decision/game theory [Poole, 1995b] . The meshing is also easily described in this framework in terms of 'expla nations'. The ICL also naturally has a way to include log ical variables, and thus we allow for parametrizable influ ence diagrams (see [Poole, 1993b] for a description of the purely probabilistic case).
The Independent Choice Logic
The Independent Choice Logic specifies a way to build possible worlds. Possible worlds are built from choosing propositions from independent alternatives, and then ex tending these 'total choices' with a logic program. This sec tion defines the single agent case ICLoT . There are two languages we will use: £F which, for this paper, is the language of acyclic logic programs [Apt and Bezem, 1991 ] , and the language £Q of queries which we take to be arbitrary propositional formulae (the atoms cor responding to ground atomic formulae of the language£ F). We write I f--q where I E £p and q E £q if q is true in the unique stable model of I or, equivalently, if q follows from Clark's completion of q (the uniqueness of the stable model and the equivalence for acyclic programs are proved in [Apt and Bezem, 1991] ). See [Poole, 1995a] for a de tailed analysis of negation as failure in this framework, and for an abductive characterisation of the logic. (see [Poole, 1993b]) Exploiting Rule Structure 455 ment of Co and in an element of C1 (i.e., VCo E Co VCt E Ct Co n Ct = {}). LetC =Co U Ct. 0 the observables is a set of sets of ground atomic formu lae. Elements of 0 are called observation alterna tives; elements of observation alternatives are called atomic observations. N.B. elements of observation alternatives can unify with the head of rules or can be elements of choice alternatives.
1r the observable function, is a function 1r : C1 -? 2°.
The idea is that when the agent decides which ele ment of A E Ct to choose, it will have 'observed' one atomic observation from each observation alterna tive in 1r{A). Elements of 1r(A) are the information available to the agent when it has to choose an element of A. We assume a 'no forgetting' constraint 2 which means that the element of C1 are totally ordered and if Ct < C2 then Ct E 1r{C2) and 1r(Ct) c 1r{C2).
Po is a function UCo -? [0, 1) such that VC E C0, Ecec Po(c) = 1. I.e., Po is a probability measure over the alternatives controlled by nature.
.1" called the facts, is an acyclic logic program such that no atomic choice (in an element of C) unifies with the head of any rule, and such that there is an acyclic or dering [Apt and Bezem, 1991] where every element of every element of 1r(A) is before every element of A.
The independent choice logic specifies a particular seman tic construction. The semantics is defined in terms of pos sible worlds. There is a possible world for each selection of one element from each alternative. What follows from these atoms together with .1" are true in this possible world.
Definition 2. 3 If S is a set of sets, a selector function on S is a mapping r : S -? US such that r( S) E S for all S E S. The range of selector function r, written 'R( r) is the set { r{S): S E S}.
Definition2. 4 Given ICLoT theory (Co,C�,0,1l'�P0,.1"), let C = Co U Ct. For each selector function r on C there is a possible world wr. If I is a formula in language £Q. and wr is a possible world, we write Wr F= I (read I is true in possible world Wr) 
The existence and uniqueness of the model follows from the acyclicity of the logic program [Apt and Bezem, 1991] .
Definition 2. 5 If Sis a set of sets, the expansion of S, writ ten expansion(S) is the set {'R( r)lr is a selector function onS}.
Poole
The expansion of S corresponds to the cross product of the elements of S and, when S consists of non-intersecting sets, to the set of minimal hitting sets [Reiter, 1987] of S. The set of possible worlds corresponds to the expansion of C. Otherwise the I CLoT theory is observation consistent. An ICLoT theory is observation complete if for all possible worlds w.,., and for all 0 E 0, there exists o E 0 such thatw.,.l= o.
The above definitions are to make sure that we can treat the elements of 0 as random variables. Unlike elements of C, they are not exclusive and covering 'by definition'. We will always require a theory to be observation consistent, but, when we have negation as failure in the logic [Poole, 1995a] we will not require the theory to be observation complete (there may be an extra, unnamed element of each element of 0). Note that observation consistency is not a severe re striction -we can always make 0 a set of singleton sets, but then we can't exploit the exclusiveness of observations.
In this paper we assume all our theories are observation con sistent and complete.
If an ICLoT theory is observation consistent and observa tion complete, then for each world w.,. there is a unique el ement of expansion( 0) that is true in w.,.. Also, for each C E C1 there is a unique element of expansion( 1r ( C)) that is true in w.,., this element is written here as 1r.,. ( C).
The elements of expansion( 1r ( C)) are the information available when the decision C is made. In other words a strategy specifies which element of C (for each C E C1) to choose ('do') for each of the possible observations.
Definition2. 9 If ICLoT theory (Co,Ct,0,1l',Po,F) is utility complete, and u is a strategy, then the expected util ity of strategy u is
(summing over all selector functions r on C = Co U Ct) where u(r) = uifw.,.l= utility(u) (this is well defined as the theory is utility complete), and
is the utility of world w.,.. p(u,r) is the probability of world r under strategy u. For the worlds that could be the result of what the agent chooses (i.e., when the selection function r selects the same element of A as does the strategy u ), the probability is the product of the independent choices of nature. It is easy to show that this induces a probability measure (i.e., for each strategy, the sum of the probabilities of the worlds is 1 ).
1 Representing an inftuence diagram
In this section we axiomatise the influence diagram of Fig   ure 1 in order to demonstrate how the above semantic framework can represent decision problems. This example will also be used to demonstrate our algorithm. In this dia gram there is a noisy sensor forb, namely bs, and a control lable sensor for a, namely as (the agent can control which aspect of a it senses).
The problem be represented in our framework as:
There are two decisions to be made: the agent must choose one of two possible values for ta and one of three possible values for d. 0 = {{ ta(hi), ta(low )}, { as(pos ), as( neg)}, { bs(pos), bs(neg)} }.
1r({ta(hi), ta(low)}) = {}.
The agent has no information available when choosing a value for ta. Within the facts, we axiomatise how the 'sensors' work.
bs is a noisy sensor of b:
bs ( as is a sensor which we can control as to whether it detects the high values for a or the low values for a (depending on the value of ta ):
We specify the priors on a and b as:
Finally the rules specify the utility function.
The above represents the whole decision problem.
Note that the rules for utility and for the probability of as incorporate much more structure than is reflected in the in fluence diagram.
3 Sowhat?
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We have presented what seems like quite a complicated se mantic construction. The main question arises is "So what; why should anyone be interested?"
First of all this is a language that forms a bridge between the purely logical languages, and the probabilistic and decision theory representations.
If Co is empty, this is a representation for classical planning that allows for concurrent actions, and uses action comple tion (in a similar way to how [Reiter, 1991] solves the frame , problem). We can axiomatise the world using logic pro grams. We have, however, a more sophisticated way of han dling uncertainty than just disjunction.
Bayesian networks [Pearl, 1988] can be modelled by Co and :F, in the same way that probabilistic Hom abduction [Poole, 1993b] models Bayesian networks. What is added is a richer language for :F, with negation as failure and fewer restrictions on the form of the rules [Poole, 1995a] , as well as agents with goals [Poole, 1995bl The language is closely related to influence diagrams [Howard and Matheson, 1981] . Elements of C1 correspond to decision nodes in influence diagrams, with 1r(A) corre sponding to the 'parents' of the decision node (these rep resent information availability when making the decision). The value node is represented as the rules (in :F) that imply utility( u) for some u.
The main problem considered in this paper is how the rep resentation can be exploited for computational gain.
Influence diagram evaluation procedures can be divided into two classes:
I. Those that do dynamic programmin g, optimizing the last action first [Shachter, 1986; Cooper, 1988; Shachter and Peot, 1992; Zhang et al., 1994] .
2. Those that convert the influence diagram into a deci sion tree (e.g., [Howard and Matheson, 1981; Qi and Poole, 1995] ), and search it using a search method such as *-minimax [Ballard, 1983] .
Once it has been realised that efficient Bayesian network al gorithms can be used for the probabilistic part of the rea soning [Cooper, 1988; Qi and Poole, 1995] , the maiD cost is in the number of optimizations that needs to be done. For each of the values of the parents of a decision node, one op timization is done. This can be improved in the decision tree methods by not considering those assignments to par ents that will have zero probability [Qi and Poole, 1995] , but there is still much more that can be done.
The main claim of this paper is that we can exploit the rule based structure to gain efficiency. We show how the rule structure can be exploited to reduce the number of opti mizations (the technique reported here is orthogonal to the idea of removing of impossible conditioning scenarios, so in principle both could be used).
Abductive characterisation
The structure is exploited by the use of 'explanations'. In stead of reasoning in the space of possible worlds (or in the space of expansion( 1r ( C))), we reason in the space of ex planations. These explanations only make the distinctions needed.
In this section we present the 'abductive' view for the case without negation as failure in the language. There are some interesting issues [Poole, 1995a] that arise in combining this with negation as failure, but these will only complicate this paper.
Definition 4. 1 A set "' of atomic choices is consistent if there is no alternative A E C such that lA n "'I > 1 .
Definition 4. 2 A composite choice on JC � C is a set con sisting of exactly one element (atomic choice) from each C E /C.
Definition 4. 3 An explanation of ground formula g is a composite choice"' on a subset of C such that FU"' F= g. A covering set of explanations of g is a set of explanations of g such that any explanation of g is a superset of an element of the covering set Definition 4. 4 If G is a ground propositional formula, expl (G) is a set of composite choices defined recursively as follows:
where /C1 ® /C2 = { K1 U K2 K1 E /C1, K2 E /C2, consistent(K1 UK2)}. F' is the set of ground instances of elements of F. expl is well defined as the theory is acyclic.
It can be shown that expl ( g ) is a covering set of expla nations of g (this was essentially proved as the appendix of [Poole, 1993b] and with negation as failure in [Poole, 1995a] ) which forms a specification (as a DNF formula of atomic choices) of all of the worlds in which g is true.
Explanations form a concise description of cases (only making distinctions necessary). Sometimes we need to make finer distinctions, for this we need to be able to 'split' composite choices: Definition 4. 5 If C = { c1, .. . , Ck} is an alternative and "' is a composite choice such that "' n C = {} then the split of"' on C is the set of composite choices It is easy to see that "' and a split of"' describe the same set of possible worlds. The main use for splitting as described in [Poole, 1995a] is, given a set of composite choices con struct a set of mutually incompatible composite choices that describes the same set of possible worlds as the original set In this paper we show how splitting can be used to construct optimal policies without enumerating all information states of a decision.
When we refer to 'the explanations of g ' are we mean a mu tually exclusive (no two explanations are true in any world) and covering set of explanations of g, as found for example by expl and either a structure on the rule base to ensure mu tual exclusivity (this is the structure achieved by translating a Bayes net into the rules [Poole, 1993b] ) or by converting a non-exclusive set of composite choices into an equivalent exclusive set by splitting and subsumption [Poole, 1995a] .
Exploiting the rule structure
In this section we show how to exploit the rule structure. We first give the fully observable case, and show how the rule structure can be used to cut down the case analysis (in a similar way to [Boutilier et al., 1995] ). We then show dis cuss the partially observable case where the observations only give partial information about the state of the world; we then must 'mesh' the cases that make a difference to util ity and the cases that can be distinguished by observations.
1
Full y-observable case
1 . 1 Motivating example
In this section we present an example that not intended to be realistic or meaningful, but demonstrated the algorithm and the some of the savings.
Consider the fully observable influence diagram of Figure  2 . Suppose each of the random and decision nodes rep resent a binary variable. In this influence diagram, if we were to naively apply a dynamic programmin g procedure, we would optimize the decision d for each of the 24 = 16 values of the parents. Just by looking at this diagram we can see that we do not need to consider the values of b (this is known as 'barre n node removal' [Shachter, 1986] ). Thus we really only need to consider the 23 = 8 values of the parents of b. What is presented in this paper is like the bar ren node removal, but for specific instances of the parents (e.g., the value of e may be irrelevant for a particular value of b). Consider the corresponding ICLoT theory. Here we con sider the two values of a to be represented as a1 and a2. a1 is thus the proposition that says that a has one value, and a2 is the proposition that says that a has the other value. The other variables are treated analogously.
Co = {{al, a2}, {el, e2}, {cl,c2}, {bl,b2}} c 1 = {{dltd2}} 0 = { { a1 o a2}, { e1 , e2}, {c1, c2}, {bit b2}} 7r ( {db d2}) = {{al,a2}, {el, e2}, {cl,c2}, {bl,b2}}
The value of Po is irrelevant for the example. Suppose, that the rule-base representation is of the form:
When a1 is true, c and b are irrelevant to the utility. When a2 1\ e2 1\ c2 is true then the decision is irrelevant. There is even more pruning that can be carried out when we take dominated strategies into account.
1 . 2 Finding optimal policies
The fully observable case is where either C1 is empty or there is one decision d e C1 (the 'last' decision) where 1r(d) = C-{d}, and when this decision is removed, the
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remaining theory is fully observable. This case is consid ered first; the general, partially observable, case will be a modification of this case.
Suppose the last decision is { d1, · · · , dk } E C1 .
Consider for each u for which there are rules forutility(u), a covering and exclusive set of explanations of utility( u ).
The explanations form a partition on the set of possible worlds (each possible world will have exactly one explana tion true). For each explanation there are two cases:
1. No di is in the explanation. In this case, when this ex planation is true, it doesn't matter which decision is made. For example, in the example above { a2, e2, c2}
is an explanation of a utility that does not involve ei ther d1 or d2. When a2/\e2/\c2 is true it doesn't matter which decision is made.
2. For all of the other cases, we treat an explanation as a triple ( di, 8, u) if 8 U { di} is an explanation for utility (u) . If this is the case then the algorithm ofFig ure 3 will compute the optimal policy. The algorithm repeatedly removes dominated explanations and splits explanations where finer distinctions are needed.
At the end of the algorithm, the resulting explanations corresponds to an optimal policy with (di, 8, u) mean ing "do di if 8 is true, and u will be the utility". If more than one of the 8i is true, it doesn't matter which ac tion is chosen (either the actions will be the same or the utilities will be the same). The 8i will cover all of the cases not covered in case 1 above.
The worst case of this algorithm occurs when we have to split on all alternatives -this is the same as enumerating all states of the observables.
In our example above, for the case where the decision mat ters (i.e., for all cases except when a2 1\ e2 1\ c2) we have the following explanations:
(d1o {at}, 7)
(1) (d2, { a1 o e t}, 3)
(d2,{a2, e l,cl}, 4)
(d l,{a2, e l,c2}, 5)
(d2,{a2, e l,c2}, 6) (6) {dlt { a2, c 1 }, 7)
(d2, {a2, e2, c1}, 9)
Explanations (2) and (3) are dominated by (1) and can be removed. (5) is dominated by (6) and can be removed. (4) is dominated by (7) and can be removed. We split (7) on { e1, e2}, resulting in explanations ( d1 , { a2, e1 , c1}, 7) and (d1o {a2, e2, c1 }, 7), the latter of which can be pruned as it is dominated by (8).
procedure optimize( S): input: set S of tuples of the form ( d;, 0, u), such that whenever composite choice 0 is true, decision d; has utility u.
output: set S of tuples of the form ( d;, 0, u), such that whenever 0 is true, decision d; has utility u, and d; is an optimal decision when 0 is true.
1. Remove all dominated explanations from S. If we have two elements (d;, 0;, u;) and { dj, Oj, ui) inS where u; $ ui and Oj � 0;, then remove (d;, 0;, u;). Ifu; = Uj andOi = 0; then remove either one.
[Whenever 0; is true, we know that di is better than d;, and so we don't need to consider d;.] 3. If neither case 1 nor case 2 is applicable, return S. (db{a t}, 7) (d2, {a2, el, c2}, 6) (d t,{a2, e l,c1}, 7) (d2,{a2, e2, c1 }, 9)
This can be interpreted as an optimal policy, which says that when a1 is true do d1, when a2 1\ e1 1\ c2 is true do d2, etc. When none of the cases occur (i.e., when a2 1\ e2 1\ c2 is observed) it doesn't matter which action is taken.
2 Partially Observable Single Decision
The partially observable single decision case consists of 4 steps:
1. finding explanations of utility(U) for each value U and explanations for the observables, using expl;
2. repeated removing of dominated explanations and case analysis on relevant observations; 3. computed expected utilities for the relevant cases of observations and 4. using the optimize algorithm of Figure 3 to generate an optimal strategy.
Suppose we have the last decision d = { d1, ... , d,.} e C1 . Dynamic programmin g would tell us that we have to con sider each case of expansion( 1r( d)) (the set of all value as signments to the 'parents' of d)-there are exponentially many of these (in the size of 1r(d)). We would like to con sider each observable in 1r( d) separately, to see when it is relevant to the decision being made. This is done by the use ofre:
is arepresentation for the explanations of the possible observations in 0. We assume that for each 0 e 1r(d), that the function re(O) is computed once and stored.
Example 5. 2 Consider the example of Section 2.1.
For the last decision, namely { d{O), d(l), d(2)}, and for each 'observable', we determine the re function which tells us what it is that the sensors detect: In general we have to check correlations between the obser vations and the cases where one decision is better than the other. The fully observable case showed the idea of to how to isolate the cases where the one decision is better than an other.
Definition 5. 3 Tuple (d;, 0, K;, u), where 0 is a composite observation and u is a number is a pre-policy if K:, is a set of covering explanations of 0 1\ utility( u) which contains d;. Set Eo of pre-policies is covering if for every world w,. there is a unique (d;, 0, K;, u) E Eo such that dis true in w,. and one explanation in K:, is true in w ...
The algorithm works by maintaining a set of covering pre policies. These can be set up using:
Lemma 5. 4 The set {(d;,{}, {K, e expl(utility(u)): d; E K-}, u) : d; Ed} is a covering set of pre-policies. This can be easily computed by generating expl(utility(u)) for each u for which there are rules. We only want to do case analysis with respect to an obser vation if it is relevant. The notion of 'autonomous' gives a syntactic criteria for determining if an observation is rele vant:
Definition 5. 7 If K:1 and K:2 are sets of composite choices then 1C1 and 1C2 are autonomous if 'VK1 E 1C1 'VK2 E K:2 'Vc1 E K1 'Vc2 E K2 ,liA E C {ell c2} � A. Thus they are autonomous if they involve different alternatives.
The following lemma can be easily proved:
Lemma 5. 8 If the set of explanations of g1 and the set of explanations of Y2 are autonomous then Y1 and Y2 are inde pendent.
We can stop expanding on observations when all other ob servations are irrelevant.
Definition5. 9 Pre-policy {d;,0I,K1,u} is observation full if for every 02 E 1r(d) either 02 n 01 -::f: {} or for all (c, K2} E ce(02), K2 and K1 are autonomous. Partial explanation (10) is autonomous of ce( {ta(hi), ta(low)}) andre( {b s(pos}, bs(neg) }, but is not autonomous of ce( {as(pos), as( neg)}). Figure 4 given a procedure for expanding a set of pre policies to an equivalent set that is observation-full. In the worst case, the set produced will contain one element for each element of d and each element of expansion(1r(d)). In many cases this will be much smaller. This algorithm contains a selection-the algorithm will be correct no mat ter which elements (that satisfy the conditions) are selected. Different selections may change the size of the resulting set (e.g., of one observation gives more information than an other, this observation should be selected first). Also note that the case analysis we do for the observations is not sym metric -one observation may only be relevant for partic ular values of other observations. These can the be combined with ce( { ta(hi), ta(low)} producing:
Which are then observation full. For decision d ( 1) value of b s is irrelevant.
Once we have an observation full set of pre-policies, we can then compute expected values (of the utility given decisions and observations), using the algorithm of Figure 5 . Com puting expected values is complicated by the fact that for a d; the pre-policies involving different utility values may in volve a different split on the observations. This algorithm computes expected utilities for combinations of values of observables, splitting cases when necessary. This proce dure treats the expectation calculation as one big sum; in any real implementation we would use some of the more efficient Bayesian network algorithms (such as clique-tree propagation).
Given the expected utilities of the observables, we essen tially have the fully observable case from which we can then use optimize of Figure 3 to derive the optimal policy.
procedure expectation( S):
input: set of observation full pre-policies.
output: set of tuples of the form ( d;, K., v} , such that when ever K; is observed, decision d; has (expected) utility v.
while 3{d;,O,K.,u) E S,(d;,6',K.',u'} E S such that consistent( 9 U 91) and 9 � O' select w E (} -0' let Sl be the element of 0 such that w E Sl replace ( d;, 9', K;', u'} in S by the split of {d;, 9', K;'' u') on n end while; Let I:
e " , -I: Then 81 corresponds to the optimal policy. [Zhang et al., 1994] .
Multiple Decisions
The idea of the algorithm for multiple decisions is the stan dard one: we solve the last decision and either replace it with a deterministic function corre sponding to the policy (by adding the corresponding rules to :F), or by replacing the rules for utility by new rules that give the expected util ity for the optimal policy [Zhang et al., 1994] .
Refinements
There are many refinements that can be given to the above procedure. A few are ru>teworthy:
1. We want to do subsumption as early as possible. Sub sumption can be made as early as the expand proce dure. Note that, for those cases where all alternatives have been subsumed, neither the expectation proce dure nor the optimize procedure need to do any split ting.
2.
We really want to compute the explanations and the other procedure s in a lazy fashion -only expanding
enough to see what can be pruned. We want to prune early and prune often! 3. Although we have specified expl here as an abstract procedure, it can be computed top-down (as in [Poole, 1993a] ), bottom-up (as in an ATMS), and we are also exploring exploiting structure in a rule-based version of clique-tree propagation.
Conclusion
This paper presented one step in a combination of logic and probability.
This paper has proposed a mechanism for reducing the case analysis of dynamic programmin g. We have exploited the rule structure of the I CLoT in order to determine the cases where some observations are irrelevant
The use of rule structure (called •tree -structure' there) for
Markov decision processes has bee n explored by Boutilier and colleagues [Boutilier et al., 1995] . Their algorithm is similar to the 'fully observable' case of section 5.1. This paper expands on this to only consider appropriate group ings of observations.
Smith et. al [Smith et al., 1993] have explored the use of tree-like definitions for the conditional probability tables in influence diagrams. The difference to this work is that we only have rules plus independent choices -the influence diagram is just one of the representations we can represent. The algorithms are also very different, with Smith et al. us ing a variant of Shacbter's algorithm. This is a part of a project to create a mix of logic and deci sion theory, where we can exploit as much of the structure as possible to gain efficiencies. This paper has only scratched the surface of the issues. Currently under development (or under consideration) are rule�based variants (that can ex ploit the propositional independence inherent in a rule base) of common probabilistic algorithms for MDPs [Boutilier et al., 1995] , influence diagrams (this paper), POMDPs and even a rule-based version of clique-tree propagation.
The representation used here is also of interest in its own right in providing logical variables that can be used for dynamic construction of decision networks (as in [Poole, 1993b] ), and can be extended into multiple agents [Poole, 1995bl. 
